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Abstract
Middleware for distributed real-time embedded (DRE) systems has grown increasingly complex, to address functional and temporal
requirements of diverse applications. While current approaches to modeling middleware have eased the task of assembling, deploying
and configuring middleware and the applications that use it, a lower-level set of formal models is needed to uncover subtle timing
and liveness hazards introduced by interference between and within distributed computations, particularly in the face of alternative
middleware concurrency strategies. In this paper, we propose timed automata as a formal model of low-level middleware building
blocks from which a variety different middleware configurations can be constructed. When combined with analysis techniques such as
model checking, this formal model can help developers in verifying the correctness of various middleware configurations with respect
to the timing and liveness constraints of each particular application.
Keywords. Model-driven Middleware, Embedded Systems Middleware, Formal Middleware.
Technical Area. Operating Systems and Middleware
1 Introduction
Significant research over the past decade has made middleware more customizable through the use of pattern-oriented software
frameworks [1, 2]. Although this has made middleware solutions suitable for a wider range of applications, managing the resulting
multiplicity of customization options has become an increasing concern. To allow middleware to be customized to meet the stringent
demands of different distributed real-time embedded (DRE) applications, recent research has focused on applying model-driven tech-
niques to DRE middleware [3]. Although current model-driven middleware approaches facilitate the correct assembly, deployment
and configuration of DRE applications and middleware, we argue in this paper that a more detailed and formal basis for reasoning
about timing and liveness properties in a variety of different middleware configurations is both necessary and possible.
Formal models have been used to uncover high-level design flaws early in system development [4, 5]. However, such models
are currently difficult to maintain adequately as the system’s specification is refined successively throughout the system development

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life-cycle. For example, decisions regarding the deployment of application components onto end-systems, or the choice of middleware
concurrency strategies, often are not reflected in these high-level models. This may result in subtle timing and liveness hazards from
unexpected interference between the middleware policies and mechanisms used by a set of distributed computations.
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Figure 1. Remote Function Call as a Time and Event-driven Interaction
Figure 1 shows how a system that is specified with only time-driven constraints in its high-level model may be refined into a time
and event-driven system during its design and implementation phases. In the high-level model, a purely time-triggered request is sent
from a service requester to a service provider through a middleware-implemented remote function call. However, the implementation
of this remote function call goes through multiple middleware, OS and network processing stacks, each of which likely contains event-
driven system elements. For example, Figure 1 shows middleware based event demultiplexers on the sender and receiver side, which
enable a single thread on each side to be used to demultiplex I/O events (e.g., packet arrivals and transmissions) from and onto multiple
interaction channels (e.g., sockets and pipes). Even the interaction channels are likely to be event driven, for example when IP packets
arrive and are moved from the network interface card into an application-accessible transport-layer buffer.
This example illustrates the general concern that many of the abstractions used during high-level modeling, such as the notion of
a purely time-driven interaction between the service requester and the service provider, may become decreasingly representative of
the system during its design and implementation. This may in turn result in a chasm between the high-level model and the actual
implementation, unless the abstractions used in the high level model can be refined during design and implementation. Thus, a
foundational set of formal models that can express both (1) high-level abstractions such as timed remote method invocations, and
(2) low-level refinements such as concurrency and interaction semantics between the objects that implement the high-level model, is
needed to support verification of the high level model in terms of its low-level design and implementation.
Furthermore, the insights obtained from modeling and analysis should be made available and used while making design and de-
velopment decisions, and vice-versa. Such a close correspondence between the system modeling, analysis, design and development
activities offers the following benefits: (1) more complete, detailed and executable models of systems, including their middleware
infrastructure, can be composed and checked; (2) timing and liveness properties can be verified with greater precision; (3) a more
rigorous and formal style of documentation can be used to capture and communicate detailed middleware engineering expertise that
is currently represented less formally, e.g., as patterns [6]; (4) with more representative models and more powerful verification tech-
niques, the extent to which systems must be “over-designed” can be reduced due to greater insight into the possible behaviors of the
system.
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In this research, we are developing timed automata [7] models of canonical lower-level middleware building blocks that have been
used to implement a wide range of middleware frameworks. These timed automata models can then be combined with higher-level
formal models to provide a faithful model of a system including the middleware platform on which the system is deployed, such
that the composite models can be verified for correctness with higher fidelity to the system itself. Performing such verification at
a realistic scale will require significant work. We propose an approach that combines the use of protocols that are provably correct
with respect to certain properties, with the use of model checking and deduction to verify the composition of these protocols with
other middleware building blocks and application layer programs. In [8, 9] we presented such provably correct protocols for deadlock
avoidance in systems with nested upcalls. In this paper we focus on creating models for combinations of middleware mechanisms and
their exploration with the model exploration tool IF [10]. Our long term objective is to add rigor to the model-based approaches to
middleware development currently being pursued by the systems research community, and to provide high-fidelity composable models
of foundational middleware building blocks to the formal methods community.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a detailed system model and states the research problem this
paper addresses. Section 3 describes our modeling approach and the middleware architecture that is captured by our models. Section 4
discusses challenges and solution approaches for tractable checking of the models we have developed. In Section 5 we present a case
study in which we use our models to analyze the impact of a specific deadlock avoidance protocol that we developed in previous
work [8, 9]. In Section 6, we present a case study of scenarios in which interference can be caused by a broader set of middleware
concurrency and interaction strategies, which in turn affect system timing and liveness properties. Section 7 examines the results of
model checking and empirical evaluation of the case studies presented in Sections 5 and 6. Section 8 describes related work, and
Section 9 offers concluding remarks and summarizes future work.
2 System Model and Problem Definition
Our system model can be expressed as a 6-tuple
 	

 , consisting of the following elements:

 
is a set of events denoting relevant asynchronous changes in the system’s state, such as the expiration of a timer, the arrival of
a network packet, or a transport-layer buffer becoming available for writing;


is a set of event handlers, which perform application-specific processing when system events are dispatched to them;


is a set of interaction channels, such as sockets and timer registration interfaces, which trigger events as a result of actions
performed on them;



is a set of reactors, which dispatch events to event handlers by invoking event-specific handler methods;


is a set of actions performed on event handlers, interaction channels, and reactors – such as registering an event handler with
a reactor, dispatching an event to an event handler, sending data over a socket, or waiting in a reactor for events to occur;


is a set of end-system threads – actions within a thread are performed sequentially, while actions in different threads can be
performed concurrently;
Note that some categories of events (e.g., the return of a thread from a method call) and actions (e.g., invoking a method call) could
apply to multiple instances and kinds of system elements. Furthermore, a given event or action can be performed repeatedly. To avoid
ambiguity, we assume that every event and every action is identified uniquely, and that each occurrence of a given event or action is
indexed uniquely by a natural number, across the entire system. We also assume that each occurrence of an event is instantaneous,
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while each occurrence of an action has a (possibly different) non-zero temporal duration, and the initiation and completion of each
action are represented by events in our system model.
Static relations. We first express several static relations in our system model, which hold for the entire system lifetime. These
relations partition actions according to the system elements on which the actions can be performed, and partition threads into reactor-
specific thread pools:
 
	

. The set of actions that can be taken on event handler  is given by    .
 


. The set of actions that can be taken on interaction channel  is given by    .
 

ff	

. The set of actions that can be taken on reactor fi is given by  flffi fi .
! 
"fi#%$'&)(+**,


-./
. The set of threads assigned statically to reactor fi is given by  0fi#1$'&2(**,  fi , with each thread assigned
to exactly one reactor, and at least one thread assigned to each reactor.
Further subdivision of the thread pools may be useful for some kinds of middleware, for example to model thread pools at different
priorities within a reactor [11], but for the scenarios considered in this paper, we can assume a single thread pool per reactor. It is also
possible for an end-system to employ additional threads that are not assigned to a reactor, but a useful middleware design idiom is
only to use threads from reactor thread pools so that it is easier to apply policies such as prioritization consistently across all threads.
Therefore, we confine our attention in this paper to the case where all end-system threads are in reactor thread pools.
Temporal relations. We use non-negative real number domain 3 to denote time, and express several temporal relations in our system
model that are useful for the analysis of system timing and liveness properties:

fi#)45
 
#%fi#%&

 ff676
86
3
	

. The set of event handlers registered for event # on interaction channel  in reactor fi at time
 is given by fi#)45  #%fi1#1&  #



fi

 
 .

$'9
 
;:'#


<6
3
=>
. The set of events that have arrived at reactor fi but have not been dispatched to event handlers at time  
is given by $'9  ;:#  fi

 
 .

fi#1$'&?

 @6 
A6
3
B

. The set of interaction channels for which event # is active in reactor fi at time  is given by
fi#1$'&?

#

fi

 
 , and a single event-specific action, such one read from a socket for a “data ready” event, can be taken on a ready
interaction channel without blocking the thread in which that action is taken.

&C5D($
 
92"#1&


E6
3
	
/
. The set of threads in  "fi#1$&)(+**,  fi that are in use at time  dispatching events to event handlers in
reactor fi , and thus are not available to dispatch other events from $9  F:'#  fi

 
 at time  is given by &5G(+$  92+#1&  fi

 
 .
IH
,J*92KL#1&


<6
3
MC/
. The set of threads in  "fi1#1$'&)(+**,  fi that have taken blocking actions that will only unblock and allow
the thread to continue when a specific event occurs is given by H ,N*9)KL#1&  fi

 
 . Note that for some scenarios such as a thread
scheduling a timer and then blocking on the timer’s expiration, unblocking will not depend on an action being performed in
another thread; for other scenarios such as performing a blocking read on a socket, an event to trigger unblocking must be
generated by an action taken by another thread.

&#1$&,O;PQ#
R
6  S
3 . The time by which the PQTNU occurrence of event # is constrained to occur is given by &#%$'&,O;PQ#  P

#1 .
Event occurrences that do not have timing constraints are assumed to have a deadline of V .

*9W9WX+fi1fi#1&
2R
6  
3 . The time at which the PQTNU occurrence of event # happened is given by *9W9YXfi1fi1#1&  P

#1 .

,NF:'#


E6
3
	C/
. The set of threads assigned to reactor fi within each of which at least one action occurs after time  is given
by ,O;:#  fi

 
 .
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Problem definition. Our approach hinges on the idea that interference occurs when the actions taken by end-system threads can
affect each other in ways that produce adverse consequences for the system’s specified constraints. In this research, we address
the specific problem of detecting interference in which threads’ actions on reactors, event handlers, and interaction channels in the
end-system middleware can cause violations of application-specific timing and liveness constraints.
To detect this kind of interference, we use model checking to search for states of the system in which two particular kinds of
constraint violations appear: missed deadlines, which are timing constraint violations that can occur even when liveness is preserved,
and deadlock which is a liveness constraint violation that usually also leads to timing constraint violations in subsequent system states.
Checking for a missed deadline in a state can be done using our system model by comparing the time at which an occurrence P of
an event # happened, to the deadline for that occurrence of the event: *9W9YXfi5  P

# ff&C#1$'&,O;PQ#

P

# . Deadlocks can be detected in
our system model by determining whether or not we reach a state with global time  after which no further action will be taken by
any of a reactor fi ’s assigned threads :  ,NF:'#  fi

 
 . Note that it is not sufficient to check whether or not all threads in a reactor
are blocked:  H ,N*92KL#1&  fi

 
	
 
"fi#1$&)(+**,

fi says only that no actions can be taken by the threads assigned to reactor fi from time  
until a subsequent occurrence of an event causes one of those threads to unblock, and only indicates deadlock if no such event occurs
after time  .
When a state containing a constraint violation is reached, the model checker can then produce a trace of the system states that
led up to that constraint violation. By examining these traces and correcting the particular patterns of interference they reveal, we
can remove design and implementation errors, and also gain insights into new techniques that can in some cases prevent, or in others
at least help avoid, those errors. In Sections 3 and 4 we describe the models we have developed in this research, and our use of the
modeling and model checking tools within which we represent and explore them. In Sections 5 and 6 we present case studies of how
different forms of interference can arise, and how model checking can be used to detect them or to verify their absence.
3 Modeling Approach
To be able to verify the correctness of customized middleware in the context of each specific application, we have developed
detailed and formal models of common middleware building blocks found in the widely used ACE [1] framework, such as reactors,
thread pools, event handlers, and interaction channels, which can be composed and checked rigorously to evaluate timing and liveness
properties in each particular application and its supporting middleware configuration. A crucial challenge is to determine the appro-
priate level of abstraction at which to model system software. To answer this question, one must look at the kinds of abstractions used
in state-of-the art system implementations. For example, distribution middleware services such as CORBA [12] object request brokers
(ORBs) provide a level of abstraction that promotes portability and reusability and hence makes an appealing candidate for formal
modeling. Since many state-of-the-art distribution middleware implementations expose sets of configuration options used to tailor the
middleware to particular applications, modeling the combinations of configuration options [3] is a useful and necessary step toward
model-driven construction and verification of DRE systems. We contend, however, that to evaluate issues such as timing and liveness,
which are crucial to many DRE systems, finer-grained models of lower-level middleware building blocks are needed to capture and
supplement analysis of crucial details related to concurrency and interaction.
The problem definition given in Section 2 guides our selection of models for analysis of timing and liveness. We rely first on
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model checking to ensure soundness. Due to the potential size of the state spaces that need to be checked, we then apply several
optimizations: (1) building highly modular models, by sub-dividing them into fine-grain composable automata; (2) encoding our
models in formats used by model checkers that allow automata to be added to a model, or removed from it, dynamically; and (3)
adopting a hybrid approach in which parts of the analysis are provided by other analysis techniques [8, 9] thus reducing the state
space that must be explored through model checking. Model checkers such as UPPAAL [13], IF [10], Bogor [14], and SPIN [15]
each have their particular features and restrictions. For example, among these four tools, timed automata models are supported only
by UPPAAL and IF, whereas only Bogor supports object-oriented concurrent constructs explicitly. UPPAAL uses a rendezvous model
of communication whereas in IF communication is asynchronous. Because our middleware models must capture time, concurrency,
and asynchronous interactions between system elements that can be added and removed dynamically, we have selected IF as the most
suitable model checking environment for our purposes.
3.1 Middleware Modeling Architecture
Figure 2 shows our modeling architecture, which we have implemented for the IF tool set [10, 16, 17]. We use the IF (Intermediate
Format) notation to specify our fine-grained models as processes that run in parallel and interact through shared variables and asyn-
chronous signals. The behavior of these processes is represented formally in IF as timed automata with urgency [18] and the semantics
of a system modeled in IF is the Labeled Transition System (LTS) obtained by interleaving the executions of its processes.
Our models are divided into three layers: models of network and OS level abstractions such as channels for interprocess communi-
cation; models of semantically rich middleware building blocks like reactors; and models of the application functionality implemented
in the form of event handlers. Although Figure 2 shows a static view of our models, the models themselves are executable in the IF
environment and can be model-checked against system property specifications. The unshaded rectangular boxes shown in Figure 2
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Figure 2. Middleware Modeling Architecture
are modeled using timed finite state automata specified using the IF language. The shaded rectangular boxes shown in Figure 2 are
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abstract data types that are used to integrate the models, but their implementations are kept outside of the models to reduce the state
space and have only a minimal representation in the models, through specific interfaces to the data. Using these interfaces, the data
outside the model can be manipulated using functions written in C++. Timed transitions (transitions that are guarded with conditions
based on clock variables) are indicated in Figure 2 by timer icons. We now describe each of the layers of our middleware modeling
architecture in greater detail.
Network/OS abstraction layer. At the lowest architectural layer, we model inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms - such
as sockets, pipes, FIFOs, and message queues - as IPC channels. An IPC channel has two Service Access Points (SAP), for convenience
called the left-hand-side SAP (lhs-SAP) and the right-hand-side SAP (rhs-SAP). Each SAP has a read-buffer and a write-buffer
associated with it. The read-buffer is used by the SAP to receive any data sent to it from another SAP and the write buffer is used to
send data from that SAP to another SAP. These buffers are not exposed in the model, since the data itself does not play any significant
role in the kind of properties, i.e., timeliness and liveness requirements, with which our research is concerned. Instead, the read and
write buffers associated with each SAP are stored as part of an IPC channel collection outside of the model. Each SAP has a unique
handle associated with it and this handle is used internally in the C++ IPC channel collection data structure to access the data buffers
associated with a SAP.
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Figure 3. IPC Channel Collection Model and Data Structure Extracts
Figure 3 shows extracts from the the IPC channel collection model and data structure. IPC SAP is declared as an IF record (A)
and the IPC channel collection is declared as an abstract data type (ADT) (B) in the IF model. Two IF procedures (C and D) are used
to encapsulate C++ functions (F and G), which in turn access the IPC channel collection data structure. In this case, the IPC channel
collection data structure is implemented as a C++ Standard Template Library map (E). It should be noted that we model the read and
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write buffers (E) that are associated with an IPC SAP as integers. Since the properties that we are analyzing are not influenced by the
actual contents of the read and write buffers, it is sufficient to store only the number of bytes contained in the read and write buffers 1,
which helps in reducing the state space of the models. Figure 3 also illustrates calls to the functions to get (D) data from and put (C)
data into the read and write buffers associated with a SAP. These can be called from inside the model to access and enqueue data for
a SAP. The IPCQ Type parameter (F and G) specifies the type of buffer (read or write). In the C++ IPC channel data structure, we
access the read and write buffers for a SAP in the map using the SAP’s unique handle and then increment the write buffer counter by
the number of bytes to be written during a write operation (G) or decrement the read buffer counter by the number of bytes to be read
during a read operation (F). Parameterizing the number of bytes to be read or written makes it easy to model the read and write OS
system calls respectively. An example of this kind of usage can be seen in the IPC channel data structure that we describe in detail
next.
An IPC channel is bidirectional. It is modeled, however, as two data-transfer automata, one for the forward direction, and one for
the reverse direction. The forward channel automaton waits for data to be enqueued on the write-buffer of the lhs-SAP and transfers it
to the read-buffer of the rhs-SAP. The reverse channel automaton waits for data to be enqueued on the write buffer of the rhs-SAP and
transfers it to the read-buffer of the lhs-SAP. These forward and reverse channel automata also can be parameterized with propagation
delays, if needed.
Middleware abstraction layer. The next architectural layer above the network/OS layer is the middleware layer, where we model
abstractions of semantically rich middleware building blocks. Here we use ADTs to encapsulate data structures like the event handler
repository used by the reactor to store mappings between a Service Access Point (SAP) and the handler associated with that SAP. This
table is populated whenever an event handler is registered with a reactor.
Each middleware primitive is modeled so that the behavior seen when the model is executed closely adheres to that of the actual
implementation. This faithful modeling of the middleware primitives in turn results in high-fidelity models of higher-level middleware
services, obtained by composing these primitive models. For example, the reactor IF model uses the IPC channel collection ADT
methods to query the I/O status of different SAPs - e.g., whether data is ready to be read or written. Using the provided IF clause,
it waits for I/O events on a set of SAPs. Once the event arrives its guard condition becomes true, and it then uses IF procedures that
are defined in the model to obtain the read-ready and write-ready SAPs. For each of the ready SAPs, the handle repository is accessed
using another procedure in our model to obtain the corresponding event handler. The handle input or handle output IF signal is then
sent to the event handler, depending on whether the SAP is ready for reading or writing. Sending these signals models the initiation of
the respective handle input and handle output upcall dispatch actions performed by the actual reactor implementation.
Application abstraction layer. In our models, we abstract the application functionality using event handlers as is customary when
developing ACE applications in practice [19, 20]. Each event handler reads data from or writes data to IPC channels, which in
turn model interactions between different event handlers. The computation performed by an event handler is abstracted away and
represented by a single transition, guarded by a constraint on a timer variable to delay its execution as necessary. An event handler
reads and writes data to an SAP using the IF procedures described before.
1We count the number of bytes in our models so that as future work we can consider bandwidth and other spatio-temporal features - for the concerns addressed in
this paper, however, a Boolean value would have been a sufficient representation.
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Property specifications for verification. In the IF toolset properties can be specified by observers [10]. Like the system model, these
observers are represented by timed automata; they are executed at each step of the labeled transition system (LTS) that is generated
from the composed system model before an enabled transition is selected. To facilitate specification, IF provides observer constructs
for a variety of events in a system including forking a new process, output events, and input events. In general an observer records
an abstraction of the actions and interactions of other automata. The observer can also be used to control the extent of the state
space that is explored using the cut statement, which cuts off selected execution paths. An observer can also be intrusive and act as
an interceptor [6] and change the system state by changing variables or sending signals. Examples of such observers are shown in
Section 4, where we use an intrusive observer to help reduce the state space.
3.2 Issues for Modeling Concurrent Object-Oriented Systems in IF
The IF toolset was developed for the analysis of communicating processes. Its basic construct for representing behavior is a
process. IF does not directly support the notions of object or thread. Thus it is the responsibility of the IF model developer to
distinguish between these concepts in the model. In particular, in concurrent systems, each method call must be represented by a
separate process, because multiple simultaneous calls can be made to the same object (method), whose computations may interfere
with each other. If each object method were modeled by a single process, all calls to this method would be implicitly assumed
serialized. This does not, however, correctly represent actual system behavior of, for example, multiple threads in a reactor.
To enable dynamic creation of processes, the IF language provides the fork construct: as part of a state transition, the fork action
creates a new instance of a named process. Similarly, processes can be deleted with stop. A method call from one object to another
object can now be modeled by the caller process creating a new process for the callee method and sending a signal to the new process
to start its execution [21]. Upon completion of execution the callee process sends a signal back to the parent (caller) process and stops,
thus deleting itself. Despite its lack of direct support for objects and threads we decided to use IF as our tool set for the analysis of
DRE systems (rather than, for example, Bogor [14], which provides native support for objects and threads) because of IF’s ability to
support reasoning about real-time properties, which Bogor does not provide.
4 Domain Specific State Space Optimizations
Our objective is to apply model checking to verify temporal properties of models of DRE systems. A common problem with
model checking is the state space explosion problem. Especially in the presence of concurrency the state space can grow very large
due to the many interleavings, even with individual processes with relatively small state spaces. Therefore it is imperative to minimize
nondeterminism and disable state transitions that do not have a counterpart in the actual system. Below we describe the techniques we
have employed to reduce nondeterminism at the system initialization phase and to limit interleavings at the execution state, respectively.
4.1 Ordering Optimizations
Because our models allow different interleavings of actions, particularly when the models represent multiple threads of execution, it
is important to distinguish interleavings of actions that are relevant to the application constraints, from spurious interleavings that could
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easily render the model’s state space intractable. We first examine interleavings caused by the order in which objects are initialized or
the order in which threads waiting for a synchronization token are chosen.
System initialization. When we construct an IF model of a system, we first establish the static structure of the system, creating both
active objects, e.g. ThreadPools, and passive objects, e.g. Reactors, and their associations. We use the IF process construct to model
both kinds of objects, so a Reactor, even though it is a passive object, is modeled by an automaton and can run concurrently with the
other automata. At the initialization phase the order in which the different objects and their associations are created is irrelevant to the
application semantics: they are observationally equivalent. However, different orders are, by default, considered distinct states by the
model checker. For example, consider an application with objects A and B that each create (fork) an instance of object C. In IF when a
process is created with fork it gets a unique id. Thus, depending on which object’s fork is executed first, we may have the associations
 
  -
 
  ,

  -
 
 , or
 
  -
 
 ,

  -
 
  . Although these two scenarios are equivalent from an application point of
view, they are considered distinct states by the model checker. Since the number of combinations is exponential in the number of
such object creations, this can significantly impact the size of the state space. To eliminate this type of nondeterminism we arbitrarily
choose and fix an object creation order, e.g. ascending order of process id values, using the IF priority rules.
Leader thread election. With some concurrency strategies, such as the thread pool reactor described in Section 5.1, it may not
matter in which order a thread is chosen from a set of waiting threads, e.g., to become the leader thread to start waiting for events on
the reactor. If the choice of a specific thread does not have any consequences for the safety, timing, or liveness properties of the system,
then this non-determinism can be eliminated, thus reducing the state space. We use a simple strategy to remove non-determinism in
this case: among the IF processes representing the waiting threads, we choose the one with the lowest process id number.
4.2 Run-to-Completion Semantics
In real-time operating systems, it is very common to use the SCHED FIFO scheduling mechanism to control preemption between
real-time threads of the same priority. We use a similar technique in our models to control interleaving between two threads. Since IF
does not have distinct native support for constructs like threads and objects, it is the responsibility of the model developer to represent
explicitly, in the model itself, the idea of a thread of control flowing through multiple objects as part of a chain of object method
invocations. To achieve this, we use the concept of a thread id maintained by each IF process. This serves to record the real-world
thread context under which that IF process is executing. When we model an object method invocation, the thread context under which
that invocation is made must be carried over from the caller to the callee object. For example, Figure 4 shows a logical thread that
represents a flow of control from one object (P) to another object (Q), with both of these objects modeled as IF processes.
P Q
Current
Running
thread = 1
R S
Current
Running
thread = 2Thread1
Thread2
Run-to-completion of thread1 Run-to-completion of thread2
S
1 2 3 4
Figure 4. Run-to-Completion Semantics for Two Threads
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We model SCHED FIFO semantics to control unnecessary interleavings. Each logical thread of control will run across multiple
IF processes until the thread blocks, and only then can another thread of control start running. Figure 4 illustrates this situation for
two threads of control. Each of these threads passes through multiple objects. Thread1 flows through objects P and Q and Thread2
flows through objects R and S. Thread1 runs to completion before Thread2 can run, where completion means that a thread completes
a phase of its activity that is totally CPU bound.
In the IF model, this translates to the notion of processes in the same thread context executing in sequence until there are no enabled
transitions in the group of processes running under that thread context. To realize the run-to-completion semantics in IF, we used a
combination of techniques: (1) keeping track of the currently running thread id as part of the state space; (2) performing thread context
propagation from a caller object to callee object; and (3) using an idle catcher to reset the currently running thread when none of the
processes in our model have any enabled transitions.
Currently running thread context. Each transition in every process in the model updates this state variable to record the thread
context under which it is currently running. Any IF process whose thread context is the same as the currently running thread will get
preference to any IF process whose thread context is not the same as the currently running thread. This policy can be expressed in IF
using a combination of IF priority rules.
Thread context propagation. To realize the run-to-completion semantics in IF, it is not sufficient that a globally accessible state
variable is updated with the current thread context. This is because the priority rules in IF are executed in the context of the current
global state of the system. The state of a process must be updated with the thread context under which it is running, before the execution
of priority rules, since this is the state that is used by the priority rules. With the first technique above, this update happens after a
decision is made in the model checker as to which process to execute next from among the list of processes with enabled transitions.
The first step is necessary, however, to allow non-determinism in the system, and consequently whichever process runs first runs to
completion. To propagate the thread context, we use an IF intrusive observer. Between any two labeled transition system (LTS) steps,
this observer runs and updates the thread context of a destination process of an IF signal to be the same as the thread context of the
source process. The observer observes the output of a signal from a source process to a destination process and updates the thread
context of the destination process to be the same as the source process. This is done before the execution of priority rules and since
the thread context of processes have already been established, only one process will run. This method has the disadvantage that if
a process sends multiple signals to other processes, then it will result in some non-determinism in choosing between the destination
processes. In our case, however, we use this technique for modeling thread context propagation along object method invocations,
where one method invocation has only one destination.
Idle catcher. The combination of the two previous techniques is sufficient as long as there is always an enabled transition in the
system. However, there could be problems when there are no enabled transitions in the system, for example, when time needs to
progress in the model. Figure 4 illustrates such a problem, where Thread1 (at process P) and Thread2 (at process R) are enabled at
(1), where a non-deterministic choice is made between P and R. Assuming that process P is selected to run by the model checker,
Thread1 blocks when process Q blocks at (2) waiting for some event. Process R is then selected to run and Thread2 runs to completion
at (3). Note that the current running thread is updated at (1) and (2) to be Thread1 and Thread2 respectively. At (3) Thread2 blocks,
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when S blocks waiting on some event. At (3), the current thread is still recorded as being Thread2. As a consequence, at (4) when Q
and S are both enabled, only S is selected by the model checker since the current thread is recorded as being Thread2. This results
in over-constraining the state space, in which a form of non-determinism which is quite possible and which may be relevant to the
constraints of the actual system that we are trying to model, is removed. To avoid such over-constraining, we add an Idle Catcher
process as Figure 5 shows. This process has a lower preference than any other process in the model, and runs only when there are
P Q
Current
Running
thread = 1
R S
Current
Running
thread = 2Thread1
Thread2
Current
Running
thread = 0
Idle_Catcher
process runs
1 2 3 4 5
Figure 5. Run-to-Completion Semantics with Idle Catcher
no other enabled transitions in the system (3). As soon as it runs, it resets the state variable that stores the currently running thread
(4). Now, when Q and S are enabled (5) one of them is picked non-deterministically by the model checker. The selected process then
updates the currently running thread context and runs to completion.
5 Case Study: Deadlock Avoidance Protocol
In complementary research [8], we have developed thread allocation protocols for deadlock avoidance that exploit information
about the application’s call graph, e.g., the depth of nesting at each position of each call chain. The deadlock avoidance protocol is a
hybrid technique that uses both static call graph analysis and run-time protocol code to avoid deadlocks. The outcome of the static call
graph analysis is a set of integer annotations to each node in the call graph. The annotations can be chosen using different algorithms [8,
9], which balance efficiency and correctness according to application-specific criteria. Once the annotations are assigned, the run-time
implementation of the protocol is used to grant or delay dispatching of events within a reactor, to avoid deadlock.
5.1 Implementation of Deadlock Avoidance Protocols in ACE ThreadPool Reactor
This section discusses our implementation of the deadlock avoidance protocol discussed in [8] in the context of the ThreadPool
(TP) reactor [6] in ACE [1]. The ACE TP reactor uses the Leader-Followers [6] pattern to share the same reactor instance among
multiple threads in a thread pool. The Leader-Followers pattern has several benefits [6]: (1) it reduces the number of context switches
when delivering upcalls since the I/O operation takes place in the same thread context as the event handler upcall; (2) it increases
throughput by sharing the workload among multiple worker threads; and (3) it supports long-running service handlers by allowing
each such handler to run in the context of one thread in the thread pool while another thread from the same pool waits on the reactor
to demultiplex and dispatch other concurrent I/O events.
Figure 6 shows how we have implemented support for deadlock avoidance (DA) protocols in the context of the ACE TP Reactor
without incurring meaningful overhead (as we show in Section 7) for use cases that do not use a DA protocol. The additional
components that we have introduced to the existing reactor framework in ACE to support DA protocols are shown with a shaded
background in Figure 6. We now summarize the sequence of events and actions that occur in the TP reactor, and indicate where we
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have added deadlock avoidance protocol support in this context:
Leader
Followers
token
1
Event Handler
Ready Handle Set
Suspended Handle Set
Wait Handle Set
TP_Reactor
with DA
protocol Deadlock avoidanceentry protocol hook
Deadlock avoidance
exit protocol hook
Annotations
table
Event Demultiplexer
2
3
4
6
7
grab token upcall
release
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suspend upcall
handle
5 DA protocol
entry
I/O event
DA protocol
exit
8 joinfollowers
Figure 6. Thread Pool Reactor with Deadlock Avoidance
1. A shared token is used to control access to the reactor. One of the threads from the threadpool acquires the token and becomes
the leader thread. This thread then waits in the reactor for I/O events. All the other threads are then follower threads waiting for
an opportunity to gain access to the reactor.
2. When an I/O event occurs, the leader thread unblocks from waiting on the reactor’s event demultiplexer. The leader thread now
has the list of I/O channel handles that are ready for dispatching to their associated handlers.
3. The leader thread then iterates through the list of ready handles and selects one I/O handle to dispatch as a method upcall to the
event handler associated with that handle (according to the associations stored in the reactor’s handler repository at that time).
Before dispatching the upcall, the leader thread suspends the I/O handle associated with the upcall. This is done so that the event
handler is not called again in the context of another thread in case the handle becomes ready again while the upcall is already in
progress.
4. The leader thread releases the token it has been holding. Consequently, one of the waiting follower threads acquires this token
and becomes the leader, hence gaining access to the reactor.
5. The former leader thread now executes the deadlock avoidance protocol. In order to impose as few changes to the existing ACE
reactor framework as possible, we used the template method design pattern [22] to introduce hook methods before and after the
upcall is made. We then added a new class to ACE called Deadlock Free TP Reactor that overrides those hook methods ac-
cording to the DA protocol. The call graph annotations for the DA protocol are stored within the Deadlock Free TP Reactor,
as a table with an annotation for each of the handlers registered with it. The number of available threads in the thread pool
is also stored as a state variable in the Deadlock Free TP Reactor. Based on the specific DA protocol, this state variable is
incremented and decremented in the protocol’s post-upcall and pre-upcall hook methods respectively, and certain I/O handles
other than the upcall handle may be suspended. For example in the BASIC-P protocol [8], all handles whose annotations are less
than the number of currently available threads in the thread pool are suspended. By default, these hook method implementations
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are empty methods that can be inlined out by an optimizing compiler and hence incur little or no overhead as is quantitatively
demonstrated in Section 7.
6. The upcall is made to the event handler.
7. The post-upcall hook method is called, in which the handles that were suspended in the pre-upcall hook method are resumed so
that the reactor can demultiplex events for these handles (including the handle associated with the upcall that was just completed).
8. The former leader thread then joins the group of follower threads waiting to acquire the token for access to the reactor.
state dispatch_event_handlers;
    provided size(hot_saps_read_set_) > 0;
        next_non_suspended_hot_sap :=
call ISS_pop_first_non_suspended_sap(hot_saps_read_set_);
        event_handler :=
call HR_get_handler(({Reactor}reactor_).handler_rep_,
 next_non_suspended_hot_sap);
        call ISS_suspend_sap(({Reactor}reactor_).sap_read_set_,
next_non_suspended_hot_sap);
        output handle_input(context,
        next_non_suspended_hot_sap) to event_handler;
        task ({Reactor}reactor_).handle_events_in_progress_ :=
({Reactor}reactor_).handle_events_in_progress_ - 1;
        task suspended_sap_ := next_non_suspended_hot_sap;
task ({Reactor}reactor_).avail_threads_ :=
({Reactor}reactor_).avail_threads_ - 1;
call ISS_mark_deny_set(({Reactor}reactor_).sap_read_set_,
({Reactor}reactor_).avail_threads_);
        nextstate wait_for_handle_input_return;
state wait_for_handle_input_return;
    input handle_input_return(par_context, rc);
            call ISS_resume_sap(({Reactor}reactor_).sap_read_set_,
suspended_sap_);
        endif
        task ({Reactor}reactor_).avail_threads_ :=
({Reactor}reactor_).avail_threads_ + 1;
        call ISS_mark_deny_set(({Reactor}reactor_).sap_read_set_,
({Reactor}reactor_).avail_threads_);
        task ({Reactor}reactor_).state_changed_flag_ := 1;
        nextstate done;
endstate;
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
Figure 7. Extracts from the IF Model for TP Reactor with Deadlock Avoidance
Figure 7 shows parts of the IF model for deadlock avoidance protocol support in a Thread Pool (TP) reactor. It should be noted
that there is a distinct difference between a single-threaded reactor model and the thread pool reactor model shown in Figure 7. In
the former, a single thread uses the reactor to wait on multiple I/O channels. Once a set of SAPs becomes ready, this thread iterates
through the set of ready SAPs and dispatches upcalls to each of the corresponding event handlers sequentially. Only after all upcalls
have been dispatched, does the thread return to the reactor to watch for I/O events again. In contrast, in the TP reactor model the leader
thread chooses a non-suspended SAP from among the ready SAPs. The IF procedure ISS pop first non suspended sap (A) is used
to extract this information from the set of ready SAPs. The leader thread then obtains (B) the corresponding event handler using the
HR get handler IF procedure. It suspends (C) this SAP using the IF procedure ISS suspend sap before making the upcall (D). All
these IF procedures are realized using C++ data structures. Note that these procedures take the reactor’s SAP set as an inout parameter
and hence all modifications made through the C++ data structure are reflected in the SAP set owned by the reactor.
In the TP reactor implementation, a token is maintained to control access to the reactor, as was discussed before. In the model,
we use a state variable to control access to the reactor: the handle events in progress state variable (E). Each thread checks this
variable to make sure that there are no other threads already in the leader role. All the follower threads block on the condition that this
variable becomes 0. In the case where multiple threads become eligible for leadership, one thread is chosen non-deterministically.
Figure 7 also illustrates modeling of a specific DA protocol in the context of the TP reactor. (E) and (G) show the entry and
exit protocols respectively. The model shown here implements the BASIC-P protocol [8]. The entry protocol decrements the number
of available threads by 1. It then uses the IF procedure ISS mark deny set procedure to suspend all the SAPs whose call graph
annotations are less than the number of available threads. After the upcall to the appropriate event handler, control returns back to
the reactor. Based on the return value, the reactor may deregister the handler, resulting in removal of the handler from the handler
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Figure 9. Avionics Example Component Model
repository, or it may resume the SAP that was suspended before the upcall. The exit protocol is then executed. The number of available
threads is incremented by 1 and ISS mark deny set is called again to go through the reactor SAP wait set and suspend/resume SAPs
based on the new state.
6 Case Study: Distributed Concurrency Scenarios
Section 5 presented a case study in which we showed the ability of our approach to capture nuances of a single sophisticated
concurrency control mechanism. In this section, we illustrate how timed automata models can be used to analyze timing and liveness
properties in a broader set of scenarios. We first describe a motivating example [23] - a simple DRE system from the domain of avionics
mission computing [24] - and show how a high level model of this system can be transformed using our system model described in
Section 2 and our modeling and model checking approaches described in Sections 3 and 4 to analyze the timing and liveness properties
of the system taking into account the semantics of alternative middleware configurations with which this system can be implemented.
Figure 8 shows the elements of our example DRE avionics system: (1) a Rate Generator, which wraps a hardware timer and sends
periodic events to event consumers that register for those events; (2) a GPS Subsystem, which wraps one or more hardware devices for
navigation and caches a periodically refreshed location value to provide low-latency response; (3) a Graphical Display, which wraps
the hardware for a heads-up display device in the cockpit to provide visual information to the pilot and a location value that is updated
by querying an interface on the GPS component when the controlling software receives a triggering event.
This example is representative of a class of DRE systems where clusters of closely-interacting components are connected via
specialized networking devices, such as VME-bus backplanes. Although the functional characteristics of these systems may differ,
they often share the rate-activated computation and display/output timing constraints illustrated here. Figure 9 shows the high level
model of the primary software components illustrating both data flow (RateGen to GPS and GPS to Display) and control flow (Display
to GPS). Note that there are two models of communication in these systems: (1) a push-model used by the rate generator component to
send a triggering event to the GPS subsystem, and by the GPS subsystem to communicate the availability of data, and (2) a pull-model
used by the display subsystem to query the location data from the GPS subsystem. The push-model is typically implemented using a
publish-subscribe event channel, and the pull-model using a remote function call.
Figure 10 illustrates a high-level model that is used to analyze properties of the system assembly - e.g., compatibility of components,
data-flow analysis, and control-flow analysis. This high level model does not include details about the middleware platform on which
the system is deployed. Figure 11 illustrates a middleware-level model of the system showing details about behaviorally rich building
blocks like reactors, event handlers, and thread pools. Corresponding to each communication channel, there is an event handler. For
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Figure 10. High Level Analysis Model
example, the Timer EC EH event handler handles remote requests sent from the RateGen component to the Event Channel(EC), the
GPS EC EH event handler handles remote requests sent from the GPS component to the EC and so on.
Figure 11. Middleware Level Analysis Model
To illustrate how timed automata models of middleware can be used to analyze timing and liveness properties in practice, we have
developed models of four simple but representative example scenarios using the low-level models described in Sections 3 through 5
to capture different segments of the middleware model shown in Figure 11. In each of these scenarios, we vary the semantics of
the reactor and event handler models to illustrate how interference can arise for different middleware policy and mechanism choices,
and to show how in each case the particular form of interference can be analyzed through model checking. Note that systems of the
kinds shown in Figure 8 can be deployed on a variety of implementation platforms, and the lower level models may vary with those
choices, e.g., two-way calls, one-way calls with different messaging options [12] (SYNC WITH TARGET, SYNC WITH SERVER,
etc. ), Asynchronous Messaging Interface [25], Asynchronous Message Handling [26]. Our models capture the semantics of common
middleware building blocks with which these different design solutions can be realized, thus giving our approach broad applicability.
Scenario 1 – blocking in a single reactor. In distributed real-time embedded systems, correct operation can depend on satisfying
relatively simple timing constraints such as receiving the result from a method invocation before a relative deadline. In this example,
we consider a case where system timing is affected by interference between nominally independent call sequences, when they must
contend for shared resources such as the CPU. We first consider a scenario where a single thread is used by a reactor to demultiplex
events to its registered event handlers. The extent to which the event handlers contend for shared resources impacts whether or not a
deadline miss can occur. Using our models we can determine (1) whether any deadline misses can occur due to interference between
call sequences, and (2) if a deadline miss is possible, sequences of actions that can cause it to occur. For example if the RateGen and
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GPS components push events at roughly the same time, then whichever event handler (Timer EC EH or GPS EC EH) is dispatched
first will delay the other event handler, potentially resulting in a missed deadline.
Scenario 2 – multiple reactors, WaitOnConnection strategy. In addition to analyzing interference arising from direct contention
between handlers for a single resource, it is important to evaluate more complex interference scenarios involving sequences of inter-
dependent actions. In this example, we show how timing properties of the system are affected not only by interfering call sequences,
but also by the strategy used to wait for replies from remote function calls. For example, consider a situation in which the RateGen
component pushes a trigger event to the EC, which in turn pushes that event to a GPS component, which then pushes a dataAvailable
event to the EC. After sending the remote function invocation request to the GPS component, the Timer EC EH handler waits on
that same channel for the reply since the push method is a two-way call in standard CORBA COS Event Service. Because of the
interference between the WaitOnConnection reply wait strategy, the topology of the event handler call graph and the use of a single
thread in the reactor, deadlock can occur if the single thread in the EC reactor is already in an upcall (to Timer EC EH) when there is
an incoming remote function call invocation request (for the dataAvailable event) from the GPS component to the EC. We can use IF
observers to detect such a deadlock situation by giving an unusually high value (sometimes called a “watchdog timer”) for the event
handler’s deadline and watching for that deadline to be missed, which would indicate that there are no enabled transitions and that
time has progressed in effect to infinity (the unusually high value) within the model checker.
Scenario 3 – multiple reactors, WaitOnReactor strategy. The problem raised in Scenario 2 by the WaitOnConnection strategy, in
which nesting of calls by the reactor leads to a deadlock preempted call chain, can be alleviated in part through use of an alterna-
tive strategy for waiting for the reply from the remote event handler, called WaitOnReactor. Using this strategy in Scenario 2, the
reactor waits for either the reply (corresponding to the trigger event push) to come back from the GPS, or for another I/O event for
Timer EC EH or GPS EC EH to arrive, and dispatches whichever I/O event arrives first. Waiting for both the pending reply and
new request events is done by creating a reply event handler EC GPS EH (shown shaded in Figure 11) that is registered with the
reactor until the pending reply comes back from GPS and is delivered to EC GPS EH. Hence the deadlock in the previous example
is avoided, since the single thread in the EC is not only waiting on I/O events on a particular interaction channel (EC-GPS), but rather
waits for I/O events on all registered interaction channels (GPS-EC, EC-GPS, Timer-EC). However, this approach in turn introduces
further concurrency issues that must be evaluated, which our approach does through model checking. Consider for example, that
when the EC makes a remote call to the GPS component, the EC thread waits on its reactor for the reply (EC GPS EH). While wait-
ing for the reply, intervening requests from other suppliers – e.g., the RateGen component – could be processed by the EC’s reactor,
and this could cause blocking delays in the processing of the reply on which EC GPS EH is waiting, possibly leading to a missed
deadline.
Scenario 4 – multiple reactors, multiple threads. The deadlock scenario in Scenario 2 can also be resolved by adding additional
reactor threads to the EC. However, adding more threads does not guarantee deadlock freedom in general, since more than one
supplier might call the EC concurrently, again leading to deadlock. Any K threads in the EC reactor can be obtained by K distinct
concurrent calls to the EC, leaving no threads to handle the call to GPS EC EH and deadlocking each call chain. We provide a more
detailed analysis of this particular problem, and of alternative protocols to avoid it, in [8].
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To evaluate this scenario, we again used the thread pool reactor model with and without the BASIC-P deadlock avoidance protocol,
as in the case study presented in Section 5. Recall that in the BASIC-P protocol, as part of the entry hook the number of available
threads in the reactor is decremented by 1, and the number of available threads in the reactor is incremented by 1 as part of the exit
hook. Using the complete model built using the multi-threaded reactor model shown in Figure 6 in Section 5.1, we verified three
things: (1) there is no deadlock with a single component and    threads in the EC reactor; (2) without a deadlock avoidance protocol
there is a deadlock when 2 components try to invoke the same call sequence even if there are 2 threads in the EC reactor; (3) when we
then introduce the BASIC-P protocol, we prevent deadlock but introduce blocking delays which in turn need to be modeled to check
for deadline misses. For example, with the BASIC-P protocol, one component could be blocked because the EC reactor reserves 2
threads for the call sequence initiated by another component to be able to complete.
7 Analytical and Empirical Evaluations
Table 1. Model Checking Statistics without/with State Space Reduction (SSR), Live Variable Analysis (LVA)
No SSR With SSR
No LVA With LVA No LVA With LVA
#states #trans time #states #trans time #states #trans time #states #trans time
Scenario1 531 540 1s 493 503 1s 76 75 1s 76 75 1s
Scenario2
1 flow 226 225 1s 226 225 1s 868 930 1s 868 930 1s
Scenario2
2 flows 229,260 229,284 699s 275,755 275,779 917s 9607 9606 31s 9607 9606 29s
Scenario3 85 84 1s 85 84 1s 19 19 1s 19 18 1s
Scenario4
3 flows, No DA * * * * * * 1460 1501 7s 1447 1488 7s
Scenario4
3 flows, BASIC-P * * * * * * 74,453 74,452 453s 74,323 74,323 412s
The results of running exhaustive simulations in IF for each of the four scenarios described in Section 6 are shown in Table 1.
These exhaustive simulations were run on a Pentium 3 933Mhz processor with 512MB RAM. For all the runs, we used the partial
order reduction and depth-first-search options in the IF exhaustive simulator, as was suggested by the IF tool developers. For each
scenario, we ran the exhaustive simulation with and without the state space reduction (SSR) strategies described in Section 4. We also
compared the results with and without live-variable analysis (LVA), which can be used to eliminate dead variables.
For Scenarios 1 and 2, the state space reduction strategies provide noticeable benefits. For Scenario 3, the results show that although
the state space reduction strategies suffer some overhead when the number of clients is small, they are beneficial when the number of
clients (flows) increases. For scenario 4, there was a state space explosion without SSR (indicated by asterisks in Table 1), whereas
the model exploration became quite tractable with SSR, although the state space does increase when the deadlock avoidance protocol
is present, showing that there are potential trade-offs in the checking required for one property (blocking factors) when checking for
another property (deadlock) is avoided through use of a proved protocol [8].
7.1 Deadlock Avoidance Overhead
We conducted empirical evaluations of the overhead of the deadlock avoidance protocol whose implementation was discussed
in detail in Section 5. Our experimental setup is illustrated in Figure 12. We used an ACE thread pool reactor watching a set of
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ACE Pipes with only one thread in the threadpool. We used a unique event handler corresponding to each of the pipes. The event
handlers do not make any remote function calls, hence the height annotation for each of the event handlers according to the protocol
is 1. This is sufficient for measuring the overhead of the protocol implementation within the threadpool reactor because even if the
height annotations are different, the mechanisms (the hook functions discussed in Section 5) for protocol execution are still the same.
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Figure 12. DA Protocol Experiment Setup
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50
No
rm
aliz
ed
 Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Overhead (usec)
No DA protocol
2 EHs
5 EHs
10 EHs
15 EHs
20 EHs
25 EHs
Figure 13. DA Protocol Overhead
To bootstrap the experiment, we wrote a constant-sized buffer of bytes to each of the pipes (1). The reactor demultiplexed the
events to the appropriate event handlers. On an upcall (2) from the reactor, each event handler read (3) from one end of the pipe and
wrote (4) to the other end of the same pipe. In other words, each event handler “fed” itself data. This setup makes it easy to increase the
number of event handlers and see the direct effect of that increase on the protocol execution time, since the number of event handlers
alone determines the time taken by the reactor to suspend a set of event handlers before making an upcall. We ran these experiments,
and the experiments described in Section 7.2, on a Pentium 3 1.4Ghz machine with 1GB RAM. For all of the experiments, we used
ACE version 5.4.7, the KUSP Libertos [27] Linux 2.6.12 based kernel, and the Data Streams Kernel Interface (DSKI) [28] and Data
Streams User Interface (DSUI) frameworks for instrumentation and processing of collected data.
Figure 13 shows the overhead of protocol execution for 2, 5, 15, 20 and 25 event handlers, each with an annotation of 1 and a
single thread in the threadpool. As we expected, the time taken was shown to be dependent on the number of event handlers, since
the protocol implementation suspends all event handlers except one before making an upcall to that event handler. It is significant that
without a deadlock avoidance protocol there was no measured overhead, which was our original goal in making the default protocol
hook functions empty methods which can be inlined away resulting in little or even no overhead for use cases that don’t use a deadlock
avoidance protocol.
7.2 Blocking Behavior
In this section, we present an empirical evaluation of the blocking behaviors in scenarios 1, 3, and 4 discussed in Section 6.
Blocking delays affect the timeliness of the system, and account for deadline misses which were found by exhaustive simulation of the
IF-models. For each experiment, we identified a set of operating system handles associated with event handlers, and for each of these
handles we measured the delay between the time when a message was ready to be read on that handle and the time when an event
handler actually started processing that message (handle input).
A socket layer DSKI instrumentation point (EVENT SOCK DEF READABLE DSKI event) was used to log an event whenever a
buffer of bytes was enqueued into a socket queue (this instrumentation point is in the kernel/sock.c: sock def readable function of the
Linux 2.6.12 kernel). This function is called by the network-protocol-specific (e.g., TCP/UDP/Unix-sockets) code after queuing bytes
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into a socket queue. This measure increases the accuracy of our measurements when compared to the alternative approach where we
might measure the interval between the time when the message was sent by a client and the same message read by an event handler.
The problem with the latter approach is that the measured delay may also include the propagation delay of the message, which might
skew estimation of the actual blocking delay that is caused by interleaving calls to the same reactor. To enable correlation between the
EVENT SOCK DEF READABLE DSKI event and user space DSUI events, we recorded the socket handle identifier along with the
appropriate DSUI events (e.g., HANDLE INPUT in an event handler). We also modified the kernel for these experiments to include
the socket handle as part of the socket data structure in the kernel so that this information was available during logging of the DSKI
event and could be used during post processing to correlate kernel and user events.
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Figure 16. Scenario 4
Figure 14 shows the blocking factors in Scenario 1 with 4 suppliers and 4 corresponding event handlers all using the same reactor.
The execution time for each event handler is 25ms. We used an artificial CPU-bound load to simulate application specific computation
done by the event handlers. The results show that with a single thread, some of the clients suffered blocking delays which could result
in missed deadlines. The blocking delay at a particular socket handle depends on the number of interleaving calls concurrently passing
through the reactor. In this scenario, clients could suffer blocking delays of 25ms, 50ms and 75ms, corresponding to the execution of
1, 2, or 3 event handlers respectively, before the message at that socket is picked up by the corresponding event handler.
Figure 15 shows the blocking factors for Scenario 3 with 3 event handlers. The Timer GPS EH event handler registers a separate
reply handler and then the thread waits in the reactor until it gets a reply from the remote event handler. Figure 15 shows that the
processing the reply may be delayed by other event handlers processing at that reactor. In this scenario, the reply processing was
delayed at most by the execution time of one other handler, 50ms.
Figure 16 shows the blocking behavior introduced by the BASIC-P deadlock avoidance protocol. We ran the experiment with
3 threads in the first reactor and 2 threads in the second reactor, with both reactors implementing the BASIC-P deadlock avoidance
protocol. The execution times of all the event handlers was fixed at 10ms. From the results, we can see that there is no deadlock,
but there are blocking delays. We measured the blocking delays at the socket handle corresponding to Timer EC EH in the first
reactor. One of the suppliers (timer) was delayed for about 30ms, which is the execution time for one nested call traversing through
Timer EC EH, EC GPS EH and GPS EC EH. Another supplier was delayed for about 60ms (execution time for completion of 2
nested calls) and a third one was delayed for about 90ms (execution time for completion of 3 nested calls).
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8 Related Work
Model-integrated computing. Integration of DRE systems using different components demands a great deal of a priori modeling
and analysis. The key theme of Model Integrated Computing (MIC) [29] is that it extends the scope and usage of models so that
they form the “backbone” of a model-integrated system development process. The Generic Modeling Environment (GME) [30] is a
configurable toolkit for creating domain-specific modeling and software synthesis environments. Ptolemy II [31] is another modeling
environment for embedded systems that provides a rich set of computation models including the Giotto model [32] that provides an
abstract infrastructure model for the implementation of embedded control systems with hard real-time constraints.
Our research fits within the Model-driven Middleware (MDM) [33] paradigm which applies model-based techniques such as MIC
to the domain of middleware. Moreover, our approach provides a more rigorous basis for middleware verification than current model-
based middleware configuration techniques. We also plan to investigate the suitability of integrating our formal models within the
GME and Ptolemy environments. Unlike the Giotto approach which creates a specialized concurrency environment for enforcement
of timing properties, our approach is to model canonical existing fine-grain middleware abstractions found in common use, as a basis
for evaluation and composition of those elements.
Model-driven middleware. CADENA [34] is an integrated environment for building and modeling CORBA Component Model
(CCM) [23] systems. The CoSMIC [33] tool set supports integrated model-driven component assembly, deployment and configuration.
[35] shows how model checking using the extensible Bogor [14] model checker has been applied to verifying event-driven systems
using an event channel. The low-level formal models we are developing, combined with the middleware mechanisms our models
represent potentially could be integrated with these tool sets to provide fine-grained model checking and software synthesis capabilities
over a common and reusable software base.
Formal techniques in CORBA. [36] introduces new stereotypes in UML and describes ways to map these stereotypes to a process
algebra (FSP) and then use model checking to detect deadlocks. In addition to the single threaded synchronous request scenario
discussed in that paper, which results in deadlock, in this paper we consider similar scenarios which may or may not result in deadlock
depending on the strategies used to wait for a reply in the underlying middleware infrastructure. Moreover, we also check the timing
properties of the system. Kamel’s work [37] uses model checking to verify the GIOP protocol used in CORBA based systems.
Duval’s work [38] also uses a model checking approach to verifying CORBA based systems. [39] uses a formal language named
TRIO to specify CORBA-based distributed applications and uses a proof-based approach for reasoning about systems and verifying
their correctness. Our work differs from those approaches in that it provides executable formal models for fundamental middleware
building blocks that can be used to verify a variety of middleware services including, but not limited to, CORBA implementations.
Fine-grain middleware building blocks. Our work so far has focused on mechanisms in ACE. Our techniques are applicable to
other environments where abstractions like the Selectors in Java NIO [40] are similar to the reactor and event handler models we have
already developed. Moreover, our modeling approach has potential application to other less similar environments, e.g., to model and
analyze the fundamental building blocks provided by platforms such as TinyOS [41].
21
9 Conclusions and Future Work
Our middleware modeling approach presented in this paper is designed to address the need for a more formal basis for verification
of correct middleware construction and configuration in the context of individual applications. The examples presented in Sections 5
and 6 illustrate a variety of ways in which evaluating timing and liveness properties can be complicated by different combinations of
middleware mechanisms. In practice, the range of complicating factors is much larger than even these examples show, which motivates
both our development of reusable mechanism-level models and our composition-based model checking approach for analysis of
entire systems. For example, different applications will naturally exhibit (1) different dependency topologies between event handlers;
(2) various strategies for concurrency, scheduling, event demultiplexing, and other crucial mechanisms; (3) alternative strategies for
handlers relinquishing control, such as WaitOnConnection and WaitOnReactor; and (4) multiple additional on-line protocols, e.g., for
deadlock avoidance(DA), real-time admission control, or security authorization. Furthermore, the constraints each application places
on timing and other properties will alter the criteria by which system timeliness and liveness are evaluated.
The results of our simulations and experiments presented in Section 7 motivate the need for detailed modeling of low-level mid-
dleware mechanisms, and evaluation of those models through model checking tools. Our model checking results show that with a
deadlock avoidance protocol the size of the state space increases. However, the DA protocols guarantee deadlock freedom under
certain conditions, and in some cases analysis can be used to determine a number of threads in each reactor that would avoid deadlock
without use of a run-time DA protocol. Model checking can be used to verify whether there are any deadline misses in the system
resulting from a variety of blocking factors. With or without DA protocols, our models can be used for model checking behavior of
systems built using the middleware primitives we have modeled. Therefore, the results of our evaluations support our contention made
in Section 3 that modeling and analysis should be done as an integral part of the system design and engineering process. Significant
further work is needed to make this vision a reality in the DRE middleware domain, but the work presented in this paper motivates the
suitability and viability of that approach.
The goal of our research is to address the problem of evaluating complex middleware environments, while preserving both rigor
in analysis and tractability in applying our approach to real world systems. To meet that goal our future work focuses on developing
an ever-expanding set of robust, modular, and composable models of middleware building blocks, and integrating those models within
model-integrated computing tool sets such as those described in Section 8. We will also continue our work on formally verified
efficient protocols [8], along with the other optimizations described in Section 4 to both expand the expressive power and reduce the
burden of model checking. Since our models are executable models, they can also be used to run guided simulations to verify specific
scenarios in cases where exhaustive state space exploration of all possible scenarios is intractable.
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